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"A Constitutional Right to be Treated
Like... Ladies": Women, Civic Obligation
and Military Service
Linda K Kerbert
The language of citizenship is a language of claims-claims
to civic identity, to authority, to reciprocal obligation, and to
mutual consent. This language has been gendered since its
origins, in ways that we are only beginning to comprehend.
Citizenship involves claims of rights-notably suffrage, and also
the right to pursue happiness in various ways, among them
freedom of expression and of travel-but it also involves a wide
range of civic obligations, including patriotic loyalty, the payment
of taxes, service on juries and service in the military. White
women have been citizens of the nation from the moment of its
inception. Women could be naturalized; they were subject to the
nation's laws and could claim the protection of its courts; as
single adult women, they could be taxed. However, from the
beginning, American women's relationship to the state was
understood to be substantially different from men's. Rights and
obligations have generally been framed in generic terms applying
to all citizens, male and female, but they have been experienced
differently by men and by women. There is a history of obligation
just as there is a history of claims for rights.
Contest over civic obligation in American history has typical-
ly been framed by four issues: (1) allegiance and its counter-
part-the obligation to refrain from treason, (2) the obligation to
May Brodbeck Professor in the Liberal Arts and Professor of History, University of
Iowa. I am grateful to David J. Manderscheid, now of Dunnells, Duvall and Porter,
Washington, D.C., to Lori Gudeman of Durham, N.C., and to Alexandra Gillen of the
University of Chicago for very smart research assistance; to the University of Califor-
nia-Berkeley for inviting me to offer the 1989 Jefferson Lectures, where this project
began; the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation and the National Humanities Center for
fellowship support; the Rockefeller Foundation for a residency at Bellagio, and the Uni-
versity of Iowa's Center for Advanced Studies. My thanks to Mary Becker, Michael
Grossberg, H. Shelton Stromquist, and H. Jefferson Powell for their good advice.
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pay taxes, (3) the obligation to serve on juries, and (4) the obliga-
tion to risk one's life in military service. At first glance, each of
these general obligations appears to weigh equally on all individ-
uals. In practice, however, men and women historically have
been subject to different civic obligations; obligations have also
varied depending on race.
The obligation of allegiance was softened by gender during
the revolutionary era. Wives of Tories were understood to owe
their first allegiance to their husbands, and the revolutionary
government protected their dower rights and the property they
held outright even when seizing their husbands' property.'
Americans spoke of "no taxation without representation," but
American women were largely disfranchised until the passage of
the 19th Amendment in 1920, and African Americans in many
regions were denied voting rights until the 1960s; still they were
obliged to pay taxes. Women have always had the right to a jury
trial, but until recently have been systematically discouraged
from serving on juries or explicitly excluded from them, and so
effectively stripped of the corresponding obligation. Although men
of European ancestry could be obligated for jury service in the
colonial era even if they did not meet property requirements for
suffrage, African American men were rarely called for service
even after they achieved suffrage in the Fifteenth Amendment.
Not until the Jury Reform Act of 1966 was a national system in
place which generally barred race discrimination in jury service.
Only a few states obligated women to jury service when they
achieved suffrage-what was understood to be an obligation for
men was treated as a privilege for women. A wide range of
gender-related exemptions characterized jury service throughout
most of the twentieth century. Not until 1975 did the Supreme
Court rule that men's and women's names must be placed in jury
pools on an equal basis.2
The obligation of military service, which involves substantial
physical risk, has not rested evenly on the population as a whole.
' Linda K. Kerber, The Paradox of Women's Citizenship in the Early Republic: The
Case of Martin v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1805, 97 Am Hist Rev 349, 368-73
(1992).
2 Albert Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voire Dire, Peremptory Chal-
lenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U Chi L Rev 153 (1989); Albert Alschuler and
Andrew Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U Chi L Rev
(forthcoming, Summer 1994). My book in progress deals at length with the history of
women and jury service in the United States. Linda K. Kerber, A Right to be Treated Like
Ladies: American Women and the Obligations of Citizenship (forthcoming).
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Women have been recruited by the military in all wars: as volun-
teers, to provide medical care, to prepare food, to spy. But in the
United States women have always been exempt from the draft;
their participation has been-to varying degrees-voluntary,
occurring outside the boundaries of civic obligation, and, there-
fore, outside the boundaries of reciprocity and entitlement. The
association between soldiering and entitlement runs very deep.
The first large-scale public welfare system in the United States
was invented for veterans of the Civil War, and, as Theda
Skocpol has recently argued, the assumptions on which that
system were grounded continued to shape Americans' thinking
about welfare long after the Civil War veterans were dead.3 At
the end of World War II, Americans continued to assume that
civic obligations and entitlements varied according to gender. The
state offered white men and women equal opportunity for suf-
frage, but gender played a defining role in virtually all other
relationships-from social security entitlements to jury service to
military obligation.
Although much talk proceeded as though the relationship
between rights and obligations is reciprocal, the actual relation-
ship between rights and obligations has often been tenuous.
Indeed it is characteristic of American political theorizing to
measure claims to rights not only against reciprocal duties or
obligations, but also against the responsibility not to intrude on
the competing rights of others.4 Excessive "rights talk" has been
criticized, with good reason, for its tendency to privilege individu-
al claims at the expense of the common good. But concentration
on competing claims for rights can have the salutary effect of
focusing debate on matters of equality; democracies are societies
defined after all, by expansive rights. The language of obligation
fits less comfortably into democratic conversation. Talk of obliga-
tion is as apt to lead to claims for entitlements as it is to respon-
sibility. Although the reciprocal of the obligation to risk one's life
for the state may be the right to bear arms, most veterans speak
of the reciprocal of military service as entitlement to veterans'
pensions, benefits and privileges. The reciprocities which obli-
gations create are as likely to be hierarchical as they are to be
' Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social
Policy in the United States 102-51 (Harvard, 1992).
" Among those who have emphasized this point recently are Mary Ann Glendon,
Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 45-46 (Free Press, 1992) and
Rogers Smith, Rights Talk, in Richard W. Fox and James T. Kloppenberg, eds, A Compan.
ion to American Thought (Blackwell's, forthcoming).
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egalitarian.
The work of feminists since 1970-often conducted in the
courts-has done much to undermine gendered understanding of
citizenship. But military service remains a major aspect of the
citizen's relation to the state which is governed by gendered
relationships and rules. Since the Gulf War, much discussion of
women's relation to the military has focused on discrimination in
promotion, sexual harassment, and the continued usefulness of
the combat exemption.5 All of these discourses have taken place
on the assumption that women's voluntary service is
unproblematic. Most explicit discussion of combat participation
and combat exemption has begun with the assumptions that
women as a class want to eliminate the combat exemption, and
that the army will remain an all-volunteer army in the foresee-
able future. But the opinions of women officers and enlisted
personnel diverge sharply on the matter of combat exemption;
enlisted women are generally skeptical.' Talk about the right to
enter combat is not the same as talk about the obligation to enter
combat at the behest of the state. As we discuss what is appro-
priate in an all-volunteer situation we are also setting the terms
for what will be understood to be appropriate should Congress
decide to replace the volunteer army with obligatory service.
The different obligation of men and women for military
service-and the concomitant issues of men and women's differ-
ent capacity for and control of violence, aggression and force-has
been a minimally examined aspect of a gendered political cul-
ture.7 As I write, an intense debate on the range of gender
identity which the military will permit is underway. This debate
was initiated by the Secretary of Defense's order to reconsider
the combat exemption for women serving as pilots and on war-
ships,8 and by the reconsideration of the ban on openly gay and
lesbian members of the military, resulting in the "don't ask, don't
' Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1992 and
1993, Part 6, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the
Senate Committee on Armed Services, 102d Cong, 1st Sess, 847-76, 901 (1991).
' But see Charles Moskos, Army Women, Atlantic 70, 77 (Aug 1990) and Hearings on
S 1507 before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 102d Congress, 1st Sess 847-901
(1991).
The most thoughtful and wide-ranging, albeit brief, treatment of the issue is found
in Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs in the Bill of 'Rights A Bicentennial
Perspective, 59 U Chi L Rev 453, 494-503 (1992).
' Larry Rohter, Era of Female Combat Pilots Opens with Shrugs and Glee, NY Times
Al (Apr 29, 1993); Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Plans to Allow Combat Flights by Women;
Seeks to Drop Warship Ban, NY Times Al (Apr 28, 1993).
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tell" regulation. This discussion is taking place in the context of
an all-volunteer army, and has not yet addressed directly the
implications of obligatory combat service for women.
In the essay which follows, I consider the most recent public
debate on whether all citizens, including women, ought to be
obligated to bear arms. This debate took place in 1979-81, in the
context of President Carter's proposal for universal draft registra-
tion. That debate was embedded in the diffuse public discussion
of the implications of the Equal Rights Amendment; in the
focused debates in Congress, which passed a male-only draft reg-
istration law instead of Carter's recommendation (the title of this
paper comes from a Congressional witness); and in arguments
conducted within the Supreme Court, which denied the claim of a
group of young men that male-only registration subjected them to
unequal treatment under the law. In Section I, I describe the
Vietnam era origins of the case that ultimately reached the U.S.
Supreme Court as Rostker v Goldberg.9 In Section II, I offer
some reflections on the relationship of women to war-making in
the past. Section III discusses the military services women have
performed in American wars. Section IV is an effort to set Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter's proposal of universal draft registration in
the context of Rostker and follows the case to its conclusion;
Section V offers some final reflections.
"[Tihe teachings of history" observed Judge Dudley Bonsal of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in
1968, show "that if a nation is to survive, men must provide the
first line of defense while women keep the home fires burn-ing."10 Bonsal rejected James St. Clair's claim that drafting only
men constituted sex discrimination and a denial of equal protec-
tion of the laws. Even as Bonsal spoke, his words were becoming
archaic; his footnotes cited not only a 1961 Supreme Court dic-
tum that "woman is the center of home and family life" and
therefore reasonably exempt from jury service should a state
choose," but also a 1966 federal court opinion undermining that
rule and requiring women's names to be placed in federal jury
pools.' Two years later, when Ruth Bader Ginsburg took over
' Rostker v Goldberg, 453 US 57 (1981).
10 United States v St. Clair, 291 F Supp 122, 125 (S D NY 1968).
t Id at 124, citing Hoyt v Florida, 368 US 57, 62 (1961).
12 The court specifically cited Hoyt, 368 US at 62, to the effect that women are "still
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the newly established Women's Rights Project at the American
Civil Liberties Union, two of the major cases on which Bonsal
rested his reasoning-Hoyt v Florida and Goesaert v
Cleary13 -were among her central targets; 4 they would both be
overturned within five years. But Bonsal could not know the
future--James St. Clair, like many others, lost his challenge to
the Vietnam draft. 5
Among those other cases was one initiated by a group of
young Philadelphia men-Andrew Rowland, David Freudberg,
David Sitman, and Steven Rowland-in the spring of 1971. The
firm to which they turned-Kohn & Savett-had been taking
many draft resistance cases pro bono; Stuart Savett felt a person-
al commitment, having himself narrowly escaped the draft by
questioning misinformation he had been given by his own draft
board, and having had his own success in overturning a draft
classification placed on a mentally ill friend.16 Rowland's case
was turned over to the firm's youngest associate, Donald Wein-
berg, who had graduated from Harvard Law School in 1970 and
joined the firm after clerking for Judge Abraham Freedman of
the Third Circuit. It was one of the very first cases of Weinberg's
career, and he would stay with it all the way to argument in the
Supreme Court, a decade later. Within six months of the deci-
sion, Donald Weinberg would be diagnosed with lung cancer; he
would die in 1983, at the age of 35.
The early briefs used something of a "kitchen sink" approach,
Joanna Weinberg recalls now. Donald Weinberg had met his wife
in law school; she was then teaching in the law and social policy
program at Bryn Mawr, and she followed the case closely. "Ev-
erything went in: the war was unconstitutional; the draft was
unconstitutional; the draft was gender specific for men." But the
people who brought the case were primarily conscientious objec-
tors; "they really saw it as an anti-war case." 7
regarded as the center of home and family life," but even so, was constrained to mention
the contrast with White v Crook, 251 F Supp 401, 410 (M D Ala 1966), which had under-
mined Hoyt's exemption of women from jury service.
,s Goesaert v Cleary, 335 US 464 (1948).
,4 Interview with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Washington D.C. (Feb 1990).
Among the losing challenges to the Vietnam War draft were United States v
Fallon, 407 F2d 621 (7th Cir 1969); Suskin v Nixon, 304 F Supp 71 (N D Ill 1969); United
States v Dorris, 310 F Supp 1306 (W D Pa 1970); United States u Baechler, 509 F2d 13
(4th Cir 1974).
Telephone interview with Stuart Savett (Sept 1992).
17 Telephone interview with Joanna Weinberg (Feb 1993) ("Weinberg Interview").
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The suit was initiated June 16, 1971, against Curtis Tarr,
the National Director of the Selective Service system. Nearly a
year later, Judge James H. Gorbey denied application for a three-
judge panel and dismissed the complaint. 8 Rowland appealed,
and the following year the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
denied-or held moot because of the end of the Vietnam
War-most of the elements of the appeal. The court did think
that the claim of unconstitutional discrimination between males
and females continued to have vitality, and remanded for recon-
sideration. 9 On remand, the court directed Gorbey to consider
whether Rowland had standing and whether sex discrimination
was a substantial constitutional question; upon such a finding, he
was directed to convene a three-judge panel. ° Within a year,
the panel-Max Rosenn, Joseph S. Lord, and Gorbey-denied
Tarr's motion to dismiss the case as moot.2'
The reconstruction of the case sent shock waves through the
original group of plaintiffs. The case had begun, after all, as an
anti-war, anti-draft enterprise; gender discrimination was thrown
in almost inadvertently. To argue primarily, or, as was now re-
quired, only on the grounds of gender discrimination meant to
concede the rest: to concede that the government might justifi-
ably declare war; to concede that the draft was not equivalent to
servitude; to concede, in short, the substance of all that had driv-
en them. To argue primarily on the grounds of gender dis-
crimination conceded that if that discrimination were eliminated,
if women were drafted, a draft would be acceptable. This was not
at all what the Rowlands and Freundberg had signed on for.
They dropped out. If Weinberg could not find another plaintiff,
one who was comfortable with relying completely on gender dis-
crimination, he would have no case to argue. Weinberg and his
new colleague, Cecily Waterman, who had graduated from law
school at Boalt Hall the year before, began to look for that plain-
tiff.
Robert Goldberg turned out to be that person. Cecily
Waterman knew him as a friend who lived in her building; he
was a medical school classmate of one of her friends. Goldberg
was young to be in medical school. Politicized by the events of
1968-71, he had graduated from Haverford High School in 1971.
" Rowland v Tarr, 341 F Supp 339 (E D Pa 1972).
9 Rowland v Tarr, 480 F2d 545, 547 (3d Cir 1973).
20 Id.
21 Rowland v Tarr, 378 F Supp 766 (E D Pa 1974).
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The draft lottery had just been instituted. "It was the first year
when you couldn't avoid thinking about Vietnam because of stu-
dent deferments; you had to confront what the war meant to
you."22 Goldberg turned down a scholarship to Yale so he could
enter an accelerated program at Penn State. He began college
that summer, and immediately began to think through the possi-
bility of conscientious objection. He would turn 18 in August.
"When I was 18 or 19," and thinking through the possibility
of being a conscientious objector, Goldberg says now, "my issues
were what they had been for the original plaintiffs. I had always
opposed supporting the killing.... I had seen the Army medical
manual-which conveyed that doctors were an integral part of
the fighting force so they could repair people to go and kill. It
said nothing about relieving pain and suffering. It was a perver-
sion of medicine."2
Goldberg's lottery number was 300. He never completed the
process of claiming conscientious exemption; draft needs were cut
back in 1972, and Goldberg finished his liberal arts requirements
and moved on to medical school. But even when the general draft
ended and an all-volunteer army was substituted, physicians
remained subject to the draft. By 1974, when Goldberg met
Cecily Waterman, the lawsuit had refocused on sex discrimina-
tion; Goldberg felt it suited his thinking precisely. He was being
trained side by side with women in medical school; if he were
challenged to support the war he thought it reasonable that
women receive a similar challenge.
"So I said to the lawyers, sure, why not? They didn't have to
talk me into it. They didn't have to make arguments. I had no
idea how big this thing would get, but it was what I was feeling.
So I became part of it."24
When James St. Clair's lawyers raised the claim that the
male-only draft represented unequal treatment of men and wom-
en under the law, they did so in a social context in which un-
Telephone interview with Robert Goldberg (Mar 1993) ("Goldberg Interview").
President Nixon was given authority to end deferments for undergraduate students in
1971. Amendments to the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 USCA App § 456(h)
(1990). Deferments for graduate students had already been limited by Congress in the
Military Selective Service Act of 1967. See Comment, Changes in the Draft: The Military
Selective Service Act of 1967, 4 Colum J L & Soc Probs 120, 139 (1968).
Goldberg Interview (cited in note 22).
24 Id. On June 25, 1975, Goldberg was permitted to intervene as a party plaintiff, the
title of the case was changed, and the other plaintiffs dropped out. Goldberg v Tarr, 510 F
Supp 292, 293 n 1 (E D Pa 1980).
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equal treatment of women and of men was increasingly ques-
tioned, but in a legal context in which unequal treatment was
pervasive. When Rowland and Goldberg and their colleagues
raised the same question a few years later, the social and legal
context had changed. By 1975, when Robert Goldberg joined the
case, every one of the old precedents-Muller v Oregon (which
had upheld protective legislation for women), Goesaert, and
Hoyt-had been undermined or actually overturned.' In the
process, the traditional language of protection had eroded, at
least so far as civil affairs were involved. If it could no longer be
said with a straight face that women's civic obligation was "to
keep the home fires burning" then of what did women's civic
obligation consist? The remaining participants in the Goldberg
suit were prepared to say that it consisted of going to war, along
with everyone-read men-else.
II
The archetypal roles of women in wartime are two: both were
named by the Greeks, and both position women as critics of
war."6 Antigone and Cassandra are both outsiders, and therefore
are less subject than men to ambivalence about doing their share
or abandoning their comrades. They are free to concentrate on
the price rather than the promise of war, secure in the knowl-
edge that if the war turns out well for their families they will
share in the advantages victory brings. Antigone confronts Creon
with the demand that her brother's body be buried. Antigone
understands that she cannot affect the outcome of battle, but she
claims the power to set ethical limits on what men do in war.
Cassandra, who foresees the tragic end of the Trojan War, ex-
presses generalized anxiety and criticism of the war.
To define the woman citizen as Cassandra is to constrain her
See Muller v Oregon, 208 US 412 (1908) limited by Geduldig v Aiello, 417 US 484,
497 (1974); Goesaert v Cleary, 335 US 464 (1948) limited by Geduldig, 417 US at 497 and
overruled by Craig v Boren, 429 US 190, 210 (1976); Hoyt v Florida, 368 US 57 (1961),
overruled by Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US 522 (1975).
' The historical reflections which follow, and those which appear in Section III, are
drawn, to some extent, from previously published portions of the book on the history of
gender and civic obligation in America at which I am now at work. See Kerber, A Right to
be Treated Like Ladies (cited in note 2); Linda K. Kerber, 'History Can Do It No Justice.
Women and the Reinterpretation of the American Revolution, in Ronald Hoffman and Peter
J. Albert, eds, Women in the Age of the American Revolution 3-42 (Virginia, 1989), and
The Paradox of Women's Citizenship in the Early Republic: The Case of Martin v. Massa-
chusetts, 1805, 97 Am Hist Rev 349, 349-55 (1992).
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permanently to the role of outsider as well as critic; at her worst
Cassandra merely whines. The role of Antigone, with its claim
that women can judge men is perhaps more appealing, but it is
best suited to exhausting moments of dramatic moral confronta-
tion. Moreover, Antigone cannot make her claim effective until
she is dead. Both roles maintain the classic dichotomy in which
men are the defenders of the state and women are the protected.
Neither addresses the role of the woman as citizen of a republic.
When the United States was founded, the theoretical under-
standing of the relationship of women to the war-making state
retained much of its classical construction. The word "citizen"
still carried overtones inherited from antiquity and the Renais-
sance, when the citizen made the continued existence of the city
possible by taking up arms on its behalf. Arms-bearing was cen-
tral to this strain of the republican tradition. This mode of think-
ing, this way of relating men to the state, had no room in it for
women except as objects of contempt. The principal section on
women and the state in Machiavelli's Discourses is entitled "How
States are Ruined on Account of Women."27 Hanna Pitkin has
recently reminded us how central to Machiavelli's thought was
his comment that "[f]ortune is a woman, and it is necessary in
order to keep her under, to cuff and maul her."28
The relationship between women and the State in the Eng-
lish colonies was governed by a patriarchal and hierarchical
system which stretched down from King and Parliament to the
"Little Commonwealth" that was the family. In this construction,
King was to subject as father was to child--or, more precisely, as
husband was to wife. "The woman's own choice makes such a
man her husband," observed Governor John Winthrop of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony, "yet being so chosen, he is her lord,
and she is to be subject to him, yet in a way of liberty, not of
bondage; and a true wife accounts her subjection her honor and
freedom.... Even so, brethren, it will be between you and your
magistrates." For Winthrop, civil liberty "is maintained and exer-
cised in a way of subjection to authority; it is of the same kind of
liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free."29
' "Come per cagione di femine si rovina uno stato," Niccolo Machiavello, Il Principe e
Discorsi ch 26 (Feltrinelli, 1960). Trans Luigi Ricci, rev'd ERP Vincent (Modern Library,
1950).
' Quoted in Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Fortune Is A Woman: Gender and Politics in the
Thought of Niccolo Machiavelli 152 (Berkeley, 1984).
John Winthrop's Journal, in James Kendall Hosmer, ed, 2 History of New England
1630-1649 239 (Scribner's, 1908).
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The relationship between husband and wife that Winthrop
described was embedded in the English common law of domestic
relations, which transferred a woman's civic identity to her hus-
band at marriage. Husbands were entitled to the use and control
of their wives' property. From that principle, there unfolded an
extensive array of practices which seemed to follow logically.
Since a wife lacked power over property she lacked the ability to
enforce a will independent of that of her husband. The best
known of these practices, perhaps, is the rule that a wife was not
held culpable for civil crimes committed in the presence of and
with the encouragement of her husband, since she was presumed
to act under his coercion."0 Whether logically linked to the ab-
sence of property, or developed out of ancient analogies with
guardians and wards, it was also understood that husbands con-
trolled the physical bodies of their wives, for sexual access or for
corporal punishment.3
Traditional constructions of state authority were destabilized
in the pre-revolutionary years as patriot leaders struggled to
articulate alternate and more satisfactory relationships between
ruler and ruled, between the individual and state authority. As
James Kettner has splendidly shown, they retained an old under-
standing of a link between arms-bearing and citizenship, but also
moved from a medieval language of hierarchical relationship to a
system which stressed reciprocity between state and citizen."
' A good source to observe the continuation of these practices in the early United
States is in Tapping Reeve, The Law of Baron and Femme, Parent and Child, Guardian
and Ward, Master and Servant, and of the Powers of Courts of Chancery 73 (Chauncery
Goodrich, 2d ed 1846). Reeve points out two exceptions to the practice of shielding wives
on the grounds that they could not resist husbands' coercion: wives could be charged with
treason, "an offence," writes Reeve, "so dangerous to society, that even the coercion of a
husband is no excuse," and keeping a brothel. Even if the husband knew of her behavior,
brothel-keeping "is an offence of which the wife is supposed to have the principal manage-
ment." Id at 73. See also Marylynn Salmon, Women and the Law of Property 41-42 (North
Carolina, 1986).
"' For general comments on the husband's power over the person of his wife, see
Reeve, The Law of Baron and Femme at 64-66 (cited in note 30). For the relationship
between the wife's lack of power to contract and the husband's power over her body, see id
at 98: "It is a general rule that a wife cannot so contract, as to bind herself; her contracts
are said to be void in law. The principles on which this doctrine is founded are two: 1st.
The right of the husband to the person of his wife. This is a right guarded by the law with
the utmost solicitude; if she could bind herself by her contracts, she would be liable to be
arrested, taken in execution, and confined in a prison; and then the husband would be
deprived of the company of his wife, which the law will not suffer. 2d. The law considers
the wife to be in the power of the husband; it would not, therefore, be reasonable that she
should be bound by any contract which she makes during the coverture, as it might be the
effect of coercion. On the first ground she is privileged for the sake of her husband; on the
last, for her own sake." Id.
' James H. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870 143-79
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American constitutional argument, like liberal political theo-
ry in general, has generally rested on the confidence that individ-
uals can be authentically bound only by rules which they them-
selves have chosen, and that authentic government is shaped by
freely chosen agreements among the ruled. Much American con-
stitutional talk proceeds as though the Revolution had created a
state of nature and as though the Constitution were a Social
Contract. One sees this very clearly in the most widely circulated
pamphlet of the Revolution, Thomas Paine's Common Sense.3
Having consented to the political order, all obligation becomes
individually elected obligation. The burdens of citizenship, in
theory, rest on all citizens alike.
Social contract thinking in the early republic thus made
space, as James Kettner has shown, for a newly developed con-
cept of allegiance (as demonstrated by one's physical presence
and emotional commitment), which gradually came to be given
equal weight with old traditions of military service.34 An alle-
giance defined by location and volition was an allegiance in
which women could join. While the old language of republicanism
deeply distrusted women's citizenship, a liberal language of inde-
pendence and individual choice could accommodate women as full
participants in the life of the state.
Carole Pateman has warned, however, that men and women
are differently situated in relation to consent theory; men are
imagined as free agents, but most women enter the social con-
tract already bound by marriage and by antecedent obligations to
their husbands.35 Women have dropped out of the story well be-
fore men gather-in Thomas Paine's words-under "some conve-
nient tree" to commit themselves to each other. Women's relation
to men is understood to be both natural and subordinate; there is
no place in the archetypal social contract for them to claim rights
as men do.
Pateman's reading helps us understand why the founding
generation did not simultaneously reform the law of domestic
(North Carolina, 1978). This modern and revolutionary understanding of the citizen
reached back to the Renaissance to include those who would take up arms for the defense
of the republic.
' Thomas Paine, Common Sense, in Philip S. Foner, ed, 1 The Complete Writings of
Thomas Paine 23 (Citadel, 1945).
Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship at 173-209 (cited in note 32).
Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, 1986). But I agree with Lynn
Hunt's analysis of the limits of Pateman's critique, in Lynn Hunt, The Family Romance of
the French Revolution 201-02 (Berkeley, 1992).
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relations. Patriot men understood themselves to be sons breaking
free of the control of their political fathers, but they did not aban-
don their own claims to domination over the women of their
family. The founders brought the law of coverture virtually intact
into the republic, maintaining the claims of the married man to
his wife's body, her earning power, and her property. It was un-
derstood that she had traded these for his protection, both civic
and personal; he was the protector, she the protected. Thus a
toast offered on the first anniversary of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence: "May only those Americans enjoy freedom who are
ready to die for its defence." In a formulation like this one, to be
free required a man to risk death. The connection between the
Republic and male patriots-who could enlist-was immediate.
The connection between the Republic and women-however pa-
triotic they might feel themselves to be-was remote. Antique
legal practices were slowly changing in response to eighteenth
century conditions, but they were not revised directly or critical-
ly. Much of the old law of domestic relations survived, virtually
unchanged, into the early republic. This asymmetry meant that
men and women would be differently situated in relation to
rights and obligations as they developed throughout the history
of the republic.
As they emerged from the war of the Revolution, the found-
ing generation transmitted to its successors the understanding
that bearing arms was both a right and an obligation of citizen-
ship. Indeed, this dual character of arms bearing is what has
made the murkily drafted Second Amendment so hard to decode:
"A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed." 6 The generic terms, "people" and "citizens" blurred
the issue of gender. Even Joseph Story, usually very careful
about who he means when he says "citizen," left it vague when
he discussed arms bearing in his magisterial Commentaries on
the Constitution: "The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms
has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a
republic."" He probably meant only men. Madison probably
' US Coast, Amend H. For recent discussions of this point see Becker, The Politics of
Women's Wrongs at 494-501 (cited in note 7); Kenneth Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and
the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L Rev 499, 524-25 (1991); Sanford
Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L J 637 (1989); Wendy Brown,
Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors and Civic Republicanism: On Sanford Levinson's
'The Embarrassing Second Amendment,' 99 Yale L J 661 (1989).
" Joseph Story, IM Commentaries on The Constitution of the United States 746, §
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meant only men. However, eventually other usages of "citizens"
and "people" in the Constitution and in statutes would be under-
stood as denoting both men and women.
What J.G.A. Pocock has called "the [American] language of
myth and metahistory" continued to connect citizenship to mili-
tary service, and to set the context in which the reciprocity of
rights and obligations was understood." In the twentieth centu-
ry, the relationship between citizenship and military obligation
has generally been debated in the context of challenges to a war-
time draft. Defending the draft during World War I, the Supreme
Court expressed a capacious civic obligation to military service:
"[the highest duty of the citizen is to bear arms at the call of the
nation," observed Chief Justice White, speaking for a unanimous
Court. "[Tihe very conception of a just government and its duty to
the citizen includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to
render military service in case of need and the right to compel
it. 3
9
The debate over the relationship between citizenship and
military obligation has rarely invoked gender. But, in 1928, the
Supreme Court addressed women citizens' obligation to bear
arms. The pacifist Rosika Schwimmer applied for naturalization.
Responding to the standard questionnaire, she answered "no" to
the question "[ilf necessary, are you willing to take up arms in
defense of this country?" No one had ever calculated the number
of women who offered the same answer or left the question
blank. But Schwimmer had an international reputation for paci-
fism and war resistance, and her application was treated as a
political gesture from the outset. Her negative reply to question
number 22 became the basis for denial of citizenship, even
though, as Oliver Wendell Holmes would observe in his classic
dissent when her case reached the Supreme Court, as a fifty-year
1890 (Da Capo, 1970)(1833).
J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment 544 (Princeton, 1975).
" Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 US 366, 368, 378 (1917). White cited Vattel, 3 Law
of Nations, ch 1 & 2, and noted that nine of the original 13 state constitutions articulated
the "duty of the citizen to render military service and the power to compel him against his
consent to do so," id at 380, mentioning particularly the Pennsylvania constitution of
1776: "That every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life,
liberty and property, and therefore is bound to contribute his proportion towards the
expense of that protection, and yield his personal service when necessary. .. ." Speaking
for a unanimous Court, White confessed their inability "to conceive upon what theory the
exaction by government from the citizen of the performance of his supreme and noble
duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation," can be con-
strued as involuntary servitude. Id at 390.
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old woman, she "would not be allowed to bear arms if she wanted
to."' The Court upheld the denial of citizenship, writing "[t]hat
it is the duty of citizens by force of arms to defend our govern-
ment against all enemies whenever necessity arises is a funda-
mental principle of the Constitution."4 Schwimmer's case was
rare-an episode in the history of attacks on foreign pacifists. Al-
though the idea of the citizen-soldier was vigorously deployed in
discussions of the World War II draft, no serious efforts were
made to draft women, even for non-combatant service in the
women's auxiliary forces (e.g. WACS, WAVES), or as nurses.42
Talk about the relationship between citizenship and military
obligation declined after World War II. Korea and Vietnam were
not popular wars. During the Vietnam era, opponents of the war
and draft resisters often stressed their loyalty to conceptions of
citizenship which involved a critical allegiance and a refusal to
participate in ill-considered, ill-founded national policies. Debate
about the link between military service and civic obligation was
dampened by the ability of many opponents of the war to avoid
service by claiming student deferments or enlisting in the Na-
tional Guard.43 The initiation of an all-volunteer military force
after Vietnam ended the draft and with it most discussions of
military obligation.
III
Though Americans have never embraced policies creating
obligations for women to go into combat in the national defense,
women have long been part of American military forces to a far
greater extent than is usually appreciated." As Barton Hacker
succinctly explained some years ago, early modern ar-
mies-including those in British America-lived off the country-
40 United States v Schwimmer, 279 US 644, 653 (1928).
41 Id at 650.
42 For a complex cultural analysis of the meaning of military obligation, see Robert
Westbrook, 'I Want a Girl Just Like the Girl That Married Harry James. American
Women and the Problem of Political Obligation in World War II, 42 Am Q 587 (1990).
' See Morris Janowitz, The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Con-
sciousness 57-61 (Chicago, 1983); All-Volunteer Armed Forces, Hearing Before the Sub-
committee on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 95th
Cong, 1st Sess 31 (1977) (Statement of Morris Janowitz, Professor of Sociology, University
of Chicago).
" I have discussed this matter in Linda K. Kerber, Women of the Republic: Intellect
and Ideology in Revolutionary America ch 2 (North Carolina, 1980), and 'History Can Do
It No Justice' at 10-23 (cited in note 26).
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side and travelled with hundreds of civilians who made their
livings cooking, selling small items, and laundering for the
troops. Many of these civilians were women, but only a small
proportion of these campfollowers were prostitutes. 45 In British
practice, with which the colonists had become familiar during the
Seven Years War, each company had its own allocation of wom-
en, usually but not always soldiers' wives and occasionally moth-
ers; when the British sailed their women sailed with them. In the
original complement of eight regiments which the British sent to
put down the American rebellion, each regiment had 677 men
and 60 women, a ratio of approximately 1 to 10.46
In the newly independent states, Patriots were skeptical
about giving women official status in the army; Washington ob-
jected to a fixed quota of women. But the women followed never-
theless. By the end of the war, Washington's General Orders
allowed no more than one woman to draw food rations for every
fifteen men in a regiment. Some, no doubt, came for a taste of
adventure. Generals' wives, like Martha Washington and Cather-
ine Greene, took their right to follow as a matter of course, and
spent the winters of Valley Forge and Morristown with their
husbands. However, the vast majority of the women who followed
the armies were impoverished. Wives and children who had no
means of support when their husbands and fathers were drawn
into service, followed after and cared for their own men, earning
their subsistence by nursing, cooking and washing for the troops
in an era when hospitals were marginal and the offices of quar-
termaster and commissary were inadequately run. Although
these women-certainly many thousands, although estimates
vary-were sometimes referred to as "women of the army," they
had no official position, and they were never eligible for veteran's
pensions or benefits.
Between 1750 and the American Civil War, western armies
were radically transformed into modern bureaucratized institu-
" Barton C. Hacker, Women and Military Institutions in Early Modern Europe: A
Reconnaissance, 6 Signs 643, 653, 666 (1981).
46 Walter Hart Blumenthal, Women Camp Followers of the American Revolution 16
(Women in America reprint, Arno, 1974)(1952), and "Return of the Number of Men,
Women and Children of the British and Foreign Regiments ..... " in New York Historical
Society 49 Collections 84-89 (1916). See also Kerber, 'History Can Do It No Justice' at 11-
13 (cited in note 26).
4' For a rare personal account of the experiences of one of these women, Sarah
Osborn, who brought food to soldiers under fire at Yorktown, see John C. Dann, ed, The
Revolution Remembered: Eyewitness Accounts of the American Revolution 240-50 (Chicago,
1980).
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tions. Uniforms denoted status and campfollowers and hangers-
on were energetically, though not always successfully, excluded.
By mid-century, in the Crimean War and the American Civil
War, armies had officially excluded all women but nurses; the
exclusion of women was the mark of a "modern" army.' George
Washington's recruits were part of this transformation.
There were even more women at the front in the Civil War;
Jane Schultz has found hundreds on the margins between civil-
ian and camp life, cross-dressing as spies and soldiers, cooking
and laundering. Based on federal card files of women who
nursed, cooked and laundered in Union hospitals, Schultz esti-
mates at least 20,000 women who worked at some time during
the war in the military hospitals of the Union and the Confedera-
cy.4" Women nurses and physicians who served in World War I
maintained a long campaign to achieve military rank. Led in
their campaign by the redoubtable Julia Stimson, they were
granted only "relative" rank, that is, a male officer would always
outrank a woman of similar status.0
Not until World War II did women achieve, as Susan
Hartmann has put it, "permanent, regular service in the military
establishment."5 Some 350,000 women-4,000 of them African
American-were involved in the four military services, in a wide
range of military activities short of combat. At hearings on the
reorganization of the selective service system in 1948, General
Dwight'D. Eisenhower spoke of women's wartime service with
admiration and said that he was "convinced that in another war
[women] have got to be drafted just like men." 2
The juxtaposition of women and military service profoundly
disturbed the sexual order. The recruitment of women raised
major questions about the relationship of gender to military obli-
gation and service. In developing a rationale for women's units,
military personnel and elected male officials stressed women's
docility and usefulness to men. Regulations excluded women from
Hacker, 6 Signs at 653, 666 (cited in note 45).
Jane E. Schultz, The Inhospitable Hospital: Gender and Professionalism in Civil
War Medicine, 7 Signs 363 (1992), and Women at the Front: Gender and Genre in Litera-
ture of the American Civil War, 70, 189, 197 (1989) (unpub Ph D Diss, Univ of Michigan).
' Kimberly Jensen, Minerva on the Field of Mars: American Women, Citizenship, and
Military Service in the First World War (1991) (unpub Ph D Diss, Univ of Iowa).
51 Susan M. Hartmann, The Home Front and Beyond: American Women in the 1940s
31-32 (Twayne, 1982).
52 Hearings on S 1641 Before the Subcommittee on Organization and Mobilization of
the House Committee on Armed Services, 80th Cong, 2d Sess, 5563-64 (1948).
112 The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable
combat duty, limited the numbers who could be accepted and the
rank to which they could rise (until 1967 no woman could serve
in a command position) and offered fewer fringe benefits than
were received by servicemen of the same rank. Women Air Ser-
vice Pilots were forbidden from taking male passengers and from
sharing a cockpit with a male co-pilot. 3 Women would never su-
pervise male personnel. "In 1944," Susan Hartmann writes, "the
marine corps got around the ticklish problem of female authority
by ruling that it was proper for a woman officer to direct men
when her orders were construed to be emanating from her male
superior."54
To receive dependents' assistance, service women had to
prove that they provided the major support; male servicemen did
not have to offer this proof.55 Women's Air Service Pilots were
all white, denied military status and ineligible for veterans bene-
fits.5 For their part, advocates of women's service have gener-
ally stressed the willingness of women to share the responsibili-
ties of citizenship. They were cautious about how much equality
they asked for, and hesitated to criticize asymmetry of status
with men.
Demobilization at the end of World War II had seemed to
restore traditional gender relations to the military. In 1945, the
army included 153,600 enlisted women, which represented more
than two percent of the force. This number was quickly reduced
to 10,000; between 1945 and 1968 the number of women in the
Army ranged from 10,000 to 15,000, which accounted for only one
percent of the force. However, by the early 1960s, manpower
specialists in the Pentagon were beginning to worry about the
Hartmann, The Home Front and Beyond at 46 (cited in note 51).
Id at 38 (emphasis added). Gender and race intersected in the construction of mili-
tary status. Only female nurses received equal pay and allowances and full military rank.
Male nurses were not commissioned as Second Lieutenants in the Army or Ensigns in the
Navy but were used as corpsmen or medics even when they had nursing degrees. African-
American nurses were segregated, employed only to care for black wounded and for
prisoners of war. See Darline Clark Hine, Black Women in White: Racial Conflict and Co-
operation in the Nursing Profession, 1890-1950 165-66 (Indiana, 1989). In a strictly segre-
gated army, four black WACs were court-martialed when they refused to perform menial
hospital tasks instead of the medical technology for which they were trained; the sentence
of a court martial to one year at hard labor was overturned only after an outcry from
citizens' groups including the NAACP. General Court Martial of Frances A. Futrell et al.,
Fort Des Moines, Iowa, Jan 8-10, 1945, (CM274866).
Although Frontiero v Richardson, 411 US 677 (1973), struck down a similar provi-
sion for those IN the service, it did not discuss dependents' assistance for veterans.
' Not until 1977, after a major lobbying campaign, and in a different political cli-
mate, would this be changed.
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quality of male recruits, and the pressures of the Vietnam War
eroded some of the traditional restrictions. As a result the per-
centage of women was allowed to rise to two percent, and women
were found giving orders to men. Beginning in 1967, women
could serve in command positions. 7
The end of the Vietnam War and the shift to an all volunteer
army in 1973 forced military planners to consider an increase in
the recruitment of women. The Central All-Volunteer Force Task
Force initiated by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Man-
power in 1972 was framed by people who predicted-with good
reason-"shortages of male recruits after the end of the draft," a
shortage they predicted would last for at least five years. The
Task Force anticipated that the passage of the Equal Rights
Amendment would make different age, marital status, and edu-
cational standards for male and female recruits illegal. Recogniz-
ing that women generally brought to their military service higher
levels of education than their male counterparts, the Task Force
urged aggressive recruiting of women and the extension to wom-
en of benefits equal to those offered men.58
The development of an all-volunteer force led to extended
analyses of whether women were capable of what were called
"non-traditional" assignments, including jobs traditionally per-
formed by men. Military women were less likely to be viewed
primarily as people who freed men to do "men's" jobs.59 The ser-
vice academies-West Point, Annapolis, Colorado
Springs-opened their enrollment to women in 1976; the
Women's Army Corps and other separate women's units were
absorbed by the male services.0 Women did indeed enlist in the
' See The President's Task Force on Manpower Conservation, One-Third of a Nation:
A Report on Young Men Found Unqualified for Military Service 1 (Jan 1, 1964); Women in
the Military, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the Committee
on Armed Services, 96th Cong, 1st and 2d Sess 264 n 17 (1979 and 1980) (appendix to
statement of Diana A. Steele, American Civil Liberties Union) (citing 81 Stat 374-84
(1967)).
' U.S. Department of Defense, Central All-Volunteer Force Task Force, Utilization of
Military Women (A Report of Increased Utilization of Military Women, FY 1973-1977) i-iii
(Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1972).
' See, for example, some of the early discussions of the role of women in an All-
Volunteer Force: U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Congress, Problems in
Meeting Military Manpower Needs in the All-Volunteer Force (Department of Defense,
1973).
' In general, Air Force had more women than the others, but West Point caught up
and is now at about the level with the Air Force academy. Annapolis continues to have
considerably fewer women-both in absolute numbers and proportionately-than the
others, because a higher proportion of naval jobs are defined as combat positions. There
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armed services and the All Volunteer Force depended on their
presence. Whatever costs the military had to pay for their enlist-
ment-particularly those related to their discomfiting capacity to
become pregnant-were counterbalanced by their substantially
lower rates of AWOL and of violent off-duty behavior."' Richard
Danzig, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Manpower in the Carter years, observed that, by the late 1970s,
"it was evident to anyone that recruiting women was a good
thing. You were [drawing in] more [recruits] from the higher
[qualifications]; you were taking nine percent of the total force,
and you didn't have to reach in to the [less qualified men] in the
pool.... Every woman was a substitute for a man at the bottom
of the pool .... The women cost less to recruit; they stayed in
longer.... Women were performing impressively. Statistical in-
dicators [showed] that women were doing well. We [in the Office
of Manpower] kept asking the services to add to the number of
women they took; to raise their targets higher than ten per-
cent."62 The Defense Department also asked Congress to repeal
the laws excluding women from combat duty; Congressional com-
mittees refused.63 In 1981 nearly 74,000 women were in the ar-
my alone; there were more female army officers than there had
been female enlisted personnel twenty years before."
The rule against assigning women to combat duty continued,
and combat and combat related restrictions excluded women from
a range of job positions that has been estimated as high as seven-
ty-five percent." But the meaning of the combat exemption was
increasingly contested, and what counted as combat positions in-
creasingly fluid. As the boundaries between combat and non-
has been no assessment of what was lost when all-female units were eliminated.
61 See, for example, Women in the Military at 87 (statement of Vice Admiral Robert
B. Baldwin, Deputy Chief of Staff of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel and
Training) (cited in note 57).
62 Interview with Richard Danzig, Washington D.C. (May 1991) ("Danzig Interview").
6 See Women in the Military at 21-22 (testimony of Robert B. Pirie, Jr. Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Manpower, and M. Kathleen Carpenter, Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense for Equal Employment Opportunity) (cited in note 57); see also Karst, 38
UCLA L Rev at 577 nn 284-85 (cited in note 36).
' Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Women in the Army Policy Review
1-11 (Dept of the Army, Nov 12, 1982). The Reagan administration established a
"womanpause" in 1982, holding women's enlistment constant before the numbers were
allowed to climb again. Id.
' Registration of Women, Hearings on HR 6569 before the Subcommittee on Military
Personnel of the House Committee on Armed Services, 96th Cong, 2d Sess 82 (1980)
(statement of Judy Goldsmith, Vice President-Executive, National Organization of Wom-
en)
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combat positions eroded, the combat/non-combat distinction was
increasingly accused of fumctioning as a social marker. "If all the
women were discharged tomorrow," Major General Jeanne Holm
observed in 1982, "most of the distinctions would be abandoned
the day after."61 6
IV
When President Jimmy Carter proposed universal mandato-
ry draft registration in 1980, the obligatory dimensions of mili-
tary service once again became the subject of widespread popular
debate. Carter sought a measured response to the Soviet Union's
invasion of Afghanistan, one which would not add to the confla-
gration but would send a signal that the United States took this
invasion seriously. Universal mandatory draft registration was to
be a sign of public readiness; conscientious objectors could regis-
ter and appeal later. The Carter proposal of February 11, 1980
required women as well as men to register on their eighteenth
birthday.6
7
Carter's proposal was consistent with his characteristic skep-
ticism of the gendered traditions of the military services. His
administration had previously criticized what it took to be exces-
sive veterans' preference policies in civil service hiring." The
federal government, every state, and many county and municipal
governments, practice some form of veterans' preference in scor-
ing civil service examinations. 9 Most states follow the federal
government in granting veterans a point advantage: disabled
veterans often receive an additional ten points on their examina-
tion score, nondisabled veterans often receive a five point bonus.
The advantages to veterans-who, until recently have been over-
whelmingly male-are substantial. Women's rights groups shared
Karst, 38 UCLA L Rev at 531 n 46 (cited in note 36). The governing principle,
Karst argues, is that "[w]omen can be in positions in which they will be targets, but
cannot deliver violence in line of sight firing." Id at 532. See also Judith H. Stiehm, Arms
and the Enlisted Woman 198-205 (Temple, 1989).
' House Committee on Armed Services, Presidential Recommendations for Selective
Service Reform-A Report to Congress Prepared Pursuant to Pub L 96-107, 96th Cong, 2d
Sess 22-23 (1980).
' See John H. Fleming and Charles A. Shanor, Veterans' Preferences in Public Em-
ployment: Unconstitutional Gender Discrimination? 26 Emory L J 13-64 (1977). The
Carter administration sought to establish a 10-year limit on the length of time veterans
could claim an additional 10 points on civil service examinations; Congressional commit-
tees extended it to 15 years. Ambushing Civil Service Reform, NY Times A16 (Jul 15,
1978).
' Fleming and Shanor, 26 Emory L J at 16-17 (cited in note 68).
116 The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable
Carter's disappointment in the failure of his efforts to limit ex-
tensive veterans' preference programs in the federal government
and elsewhere. Veterans' preference, after all, is a construction of
the reciprocal obligations of military service. The practice is a
gesture of gratitude by the community, which offers the tax-sup-
ported jobs in its control to those who have disrupted and risked
their lives to protect it. However, in a context in which large
numbers of men serve-most involuntarily-and small numbers
of women serve, all voluntarily, the result of veterans' preference
is to permit one gender virtually to monopolize all positions on
the public payroll except those "marked" female-switchboard
operators, file clerks, secretaries-which men have determined
they do not want. Only a year before Carter's universal registra-
tion proposal, the Supreme Court upheld Massachusetts' capa-
cious veterans preference statute, which gave all veterans,
whether or not they had seen combat duty, lifetime privilege in
the competition for state positions. °
Carter's formal statement on his proposal to register women
unwittingly embodied the ambivalence which even proponents of
the measure felt. He began by describing universal registration
as a recognition of changing times; then he called it an obliga-
tion:
My decision to register women is a recognition of the reality
that both women and men are working members of our soci-
ety. It confirms what is already obvious.., that women are
now providing all types of skills in every profession. The
military should be no exception. In fact, there are already
150,000 women serving in our armed forces today.... There
is no distinction possible, on the basis of ability or perfor-
mance, that would allow me to exclude women from an obli-
gation to register.7
He promised to retain women's combat exemption but almost
immediately added that women were already very close to com-
bat exposure. He linked registration to women's expanded will-
ingness to meet "the responsibilities of citizenship. That is as
true of the military services as it is of the political arena or the
70 Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v Feeney, 442 US 256, 281 (1979).
7' Hearings on Military Posture and HR 6495 before the Subcommittee on Military
Personnel of the House Committee on Armed Services, 96th Cong, 2d Sess 135 (1980
(statement of Jimmy Carter, President of the United States).
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economy of our nation."72 Then, Carter raised the political
stakes by introducing the proposed Equal Rights Amendment
into his argument: "Just as we are asking women to assume ad-
ditional responsibilities, it is more urgent than ever that the
women in America have full and equal rights under the Constitu-
tion. Equal obligations deserve equal rights."" But, Carter em-
phasized, equal registration would not necessarily mean equal
vulnerability to combat duty. "Equity" does not require, Carter
said, "that men and women be inducted in equal numbers....
Equity is achieved when both men and women are asked to serve
in proportion to the ability of the Armed Forces to use them ef-
fectively."74
Richard Danzig and his colleagues thought that Carter's
universal selective service registration represented common
sense; they understood registration primarily as a symbolic mat-
ter---"the lead time was not great; the information eroded fairly
quickly; at mobilization you could set up a system rapidly.""
They had, in fact, testified in favor of registering women even
before Carter's proposal.76 They were surprised by the intensity
of Congressional resistance.7
The House and Senate Armed Services Committees held
extended hearings on the President's proposal. The President and
his supporters sought to separate the issue of universal registra-
tion from the issues of the actual draft and the use of women in
combat. They argued that decisions on whether women would
actually be drafted (and, if so, whether mothers would be ex-
empted) and whether women would be placed in combat positions
could be left for future debate. They also argued that registration
did not necessarily mean that one would be drafted; men who
72 Id.
73 Id.
Presidential Recommendations for Selective Service Reform at 23 (cited in note 67).
75 Danzig Interview (cited in note 62).
" See Reinstitution of Procedures for Registration under the Military Selective
Service Act, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Manpower Personnel of the Senate
Committee on Armed Services, 96th Cong, 1st Sess 10-11 (1979) (statements of General
Bernard W. Rogers, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Admiral Thomas B. Haywood, Chief of
Naval Operations; General Lew Allen, Jr., Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; and General
Louis H. Wilson, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps). For Pirie's doubts that in the case of
a draft, men would insist on combat duty for women, see Hearings before the Subcommit-
tee on Military Personnel of the House Committee on Armed Services at 24-25 (cited in
note 63).
" Danzig Interview (cited in note 62).
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planned to request exemption as conscientious objectors were still
required to register.
Opponents insisted that the issues were linked. They argued
that since the primary goal of Selective Service was to identify
combat-ready men, there was no need to register women if they
were not going to be used in combat. When both House and Sen-
ate committees rejected registering women, Senator Nancy
Kassenbaum introduced a resolution on the floor of the Senate
that "would have prevented the President from registering men
unless he also registered women."78
Ultimately, Congress authorized a male-only draft registra-
tion and Robert Goldberg and his colleagues challenged the con-
stitutionality of selective service for men only in court. These
debates-in Congress and in the courts-necessarily involved the
expression of ideas about the appropriate military roles and obli-
gations of men and women. The discourse revealed ambivalence
and anxiety, both on the left and on the right, which filtered also
into the contemporaneous debate on the Equal Rights Amend-
ment.79
Indeed, political scientist Jane Mansbridge has virtually
blamed the defeat of the ERA on the failure of proponents to
defuse the military issue, and has claimed that feminists "uncon-
sciously and occasionally consciously" restricted debate about
women in combat."0 As Jane De Hart and Donald Mathews have
recently shown, even when discussion of the implications of the
ERA for military obligation was encouraged, as it was in North
Carolina, opponents were not convinced.8 One of the major
rocks on which the ERA debates foundered was the claim that
proponents were flinging innocent young girls into the military
machine-there to be treated as no better than men, and to be
brutalized. "'Today', a mother wrote Senator Sam Ervin after the
ERA had passed the Senate, 'I am ashamed and terrified at what
the future holds for my three little girls. Will my shy, sweet
"' Herma Hill Kay, Text, Cases and Materials on Sex-Based Discrimination 21 (West,
2d ed 1981).
"' Carter had recognized this from the first; his statement had mentioned ERA as a
necessary component: "Equal obligations," he said, "deserve equal rights." See Presidential
Recommendations for Selective Service Reform at 23 (cited in note 67).
'o Jane J. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA 67-89 (Chicago, 1986). Donald R.
Mathews and Jane Sherron De Hart, Sex, Gender and the Politics of the ERA: A State and
A Nation 138-40 (Oxford, 1990).
" Mathews and De Hart, Sex, Gender and the Politics of the ERA at 138-40 (cited in
note 80).
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Tommy be drafted in six years? So modest I can't even see her
undress. Oh God!.... I can't stand it. I just can't bear it.'... To
this mother, 'Sex' meant the intimate privacy of shy little girls
and equality meant ravaging them, stripping away the protection
of innocence and thrusting them into battle. It. is impossible to
understand the opposition to the ERA without appreciating this
dimension of military obligation: for opponents, the ERA stood for
defilement; to resist the ERA was a rite of purification."82
In the anxious debates on military service, the ancient con-
nection, still not well understood, between arms bearing and
citizenship, and between citizenship and manhood, remained a
subtext. Occasionally the subtext was clearly revealed. Richard
White, Chair of the Military Personnel Subcommittee, observed
that choices about registration were contingent on whether one
believed all young people "owe a certain number of years to the
U.S. government."' The subtext had its own novel dimensions;
since the administration was not challenging the combat exemp-
tion, the registration of women would actually increase the pro-
portion of drafted men who would be exposed to combat or com-
bat related positions." And, although supporters of registration
tried to keep their distance from its implications for the exercise
of violence by women, many regarded it as a slippery slope-from
registration, to the voluntary exercise of violence by women, to a
future in which women would be required to train for and exer-
cise violence.' 5
Feminists and liberals who testified on the issue rarely sup-
ported either registration or the draft. Most opposed the entire
package. Pat Schroeder of Colorado sneered at draft registration
as an idle gesture and a waste of money which could be better
spent buying spare parts so that we really could frighten the
Russians." However, when pushed into a corner, feminists gen-
erally conceded the legitimacy of a draft, and emphasized that if
Id at 162-63. On the cultural bases of resistance to the ERA, see ch 6.
Hearing on National Service Legislation before the Subcommittee on Military
Personnel of the House Committee on Armed Services, 96th Cong, 2d Sess 101ff (1980).
' See Hearings on Military Posture and HR 6495 at 151 (cited in note 71). In 1980,
six out of seven men were in non-combat positions; five percent of army occupational
classifications were combat but they accounted for forty-three percent of all army jobs. Id.
" ... [Vliolent sacrifice and state-disciplined service have been imagined in
American culture to be masculine domains." Cynthia Enloe, The MorningAfter: Sexual Poli-
tics at the End of the Cold War 202 (Berkeley, 1993).
' Selective Service Registration Hearing Before the Task Force on Defense and
International Affairs of the House Committee on the Budget, 96th Co.ng, 2d Sess 1-5
(1980) (testimony of Patricia Schroeder, United States Representative, Colorado).
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there had to be draft registration, it should include women as
well as men. No one played Rosika Schwimmer. No one played
Antigone, no one played Cassandra.
Judy Goldsmith, testifying for NOW before the House Armed
Service Committee, was one of many liberals who linked military
service to citizenship in very traditional terms. If there is to be
registration and a draft, she said, "NOW believes they must in-
clude women. As a matter of fairness and equity.... Any regis-
tration or draft that excluded females would be challenged as an
unconstitutional denial of rights under the fifth amendment."87
Goldsmith focused on what acceptance of a military obliga-
tion would do for women in a non-military context; it would en-
able them to claim the veterans' preferences which permeated
the social order. These preferences were implicit: "Those who op-
pose the registration and draft for females say they seek to pro-
tect women. But omission from the registration and draft ulti-
mately robs women of the right to first-class citizenship and
paves the way to underpaying women all the days of their lives.
Moreover, because men exclude women here, they justify exclud-
ing women from the decisionmaking of our Nation.... "
Significantly, these preferences were also explicit, embedded
in federal and state civil service laws which barred well-paying
jobs in precisely those fields, like police work, which women were
just beginning to enter, and in the jobs and training which the
military itself offered:
Discrimination against women in the military depresses
opportunities, career paths, training, and benefits for wom-
en. The military provides thousands of jobs, training pro-
grams, and educational opportunities which are, for the most
part, presently closed to women. Military pay, which is on
the average some 40 percent higher than female civilian pay
could be the only way out of poverty for countless young
women. Restrictions on women in the military, far from
protecting them, serve to continue their second-class citizen-
ship, pay and opportunity. And this discrimination exercised
by the military affects women's lives, and employment op-
portunities and wages throughout their entire work lives
because of veterans preferences.89
'7 Id at 38 (testimony of Judy Goldsmith) (emphasis added).
8 Id at 40.
" Id. In Hearings on Military Posture and HR 6569 at 82 (cited in note 71), Gold-
smith makes the point that "approximately 83% of enlisted women are in the four lowest
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Goldsmith concluded by returning to the combat exemption:
The discrimination against women in the military has other
far-reaching consequences. Being told that they are unfit for
combat training, that they need protection, women are more
readily victims of violence of every kind. Without training
and the confidence that they can defend themselves, most
women live in daily fear of physical assault. One must
ask.., whether a would be rapist would be less likely to
attack a woman if he thought she had been trained as a
Marine.90
Comfortably misunderstanding the point, Kathleen Teague, rep-
resenting the Eagle Forum in the absence of Phyllis Schlafly,
replied, "[tihe purpose of the military, of course, is the defense of
our country. It is not to provide upward mobility or career oppor-
tunities for women."9'
Teague was an effective voice for the opposition. The "right"
to be excused from the draft was a right "which every American
women has enjoyed since our country was born," and she wanted
to know what they would get for giving up their "constitutional
right to be treated like American ladies."92 In seeking equitable
treatment of men and women, Goldsmith and her colleagues had
emphasized the equality of men and women. The implications of
equality, as Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Pirie ob-
served during the hearings, led straight to a military obligation:
"Since women have proven that they can serve successfully as
volunteers in the Armed Forces, equity suggests that they be
pay grades as compared to 68% of the men. The four highest pay grades hold 23% of the
enlisted men and only 3% of the enlisted women."
Mr. White: So you ... are advocating women in combat?
Goldsmith: We are not advocating women in combat. We are saying the combat bar
should be removed because it acts as a discriminatory disadvantage to women in the
military.
Mr. White: If you take the bars down, then you are saying women should be in
combat, otherwise you are still discriminating.
Ms. Goldsmith: That is vastly different from advocating... We say, yes, if anyone is
in combat, men and women should be in combat.
Mr. White: In all capacities, all MOS's?
Goldsmith: In all the individuals are capable of performing, yes.
Id at 99.
Selective Service Registration at 41-42 (cited in note 86).
" Id at 71.
"Our young women have a constitutional right to be treated like American ladies,
with the respect and the chivalry that ladies are accorded in the Judeo-Christian cul-
ture. . . . "Hearings on Military Posture and HR 6569 at 105 (cited in note 89).
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liable to serve as draftees if conscription is reinstated."93 Teague
and her colleagues emphasized difference, a difference embedded
in traditional patterns of "respect, chivalry," and religious cul-
ture. "Servicewomen are not fungible with servicemen," said
Teague: "on the average, women have only 60 percent of the
physical strength of men .... Motherhood is not fungible with
fatherhood.... Our daughters are not fungible with our sons.
The drafting of wives is not fungible with the drafting of hus-
bands. . . . "" Registration was no idle gesture; it was prepara-
tion for real conflict. Teague refused to treat it as an emblem of
equal status under law. "We expect our servicemen to be tough
enough to defend us against any enemy-and we want our wom-
en to be feminine and human enough to transform our service-
men into good husbands, fathers and citizens upon their return
from battle." Like Tommy's mother, she harbored no illusions
about military life; the Tailhook scandal a decade later would not
surprise her. "We don't want our daughters subjected to the Ar-
my environment where there is little or no privacy, where the
rape rate is considerably higher than in civilian life, where there
is open toleration of immoral sex ... where illegitimate births
receive equal honor and financial rewards with legitimate
births."95 For Teague, the maintenance of gender difference was
a matter of civil rights: "Our young women have the right to be
feminine, to get married, to build families and to have homes.
Our daughters should not be deprived of rights which every
American woman has enjoyed since our country was born.... "
Most importantly, in making this proposal, the opponents of the
ERA had finally shown their hand: Teague and her colleagues
were not going to give up this right to be free of a military obliga-
tion "just because a handful of women, unhappy with their gen-
der, want to be treated like men.""
A few months before the invasion of Afghanistan, Donald
Weinberg received a notice from the Clerk of Court for the Third
Circuit. Since no action had been taken for a year, unless he did
something in thirty days the Goldberg case would be dis-
missed.97 There was a "flurry of activity," Joanna Weinberg re-
93 Id at 7.
'4 Id at 105.
9' Id at 103.
Id at 105.
'7 Goldberg v Tarr, 510 F Supp 292, 294 (E D Pa 1980).
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members.98 The Selective Service Board asked for a summary
judgement because of the *shift to an all-volunteer army; the
three judge panel denied their request. Weinberg and his col-
leagues prepared, finally, for their court appearance. As they did
so, Carter proposed universal selective service registration and
Congress began to debate it. "It hit the press; there was immense
publicity," Joanna Weinberg recalls.9 Isabelle Pinzler of the
American Civil Liberties Union and Barbara Brown of the
Women's Law Center in Philadelphia began to work with Wein-
berg. Shortly before the case went to trial in 1980, President
Carter's proposed universal selective service registration failed,
and Congress had established a male-only draft.
Goldberg and his colleagues won.' ° The District Court em-
phasized that "[c]lassifications based upon gender, not unlike
those based upon race, have traditionally been the touchstone for
pervasive and often subtle discrimination."'0 ' It placed on the
government the responsibility of establishing that "the exclusion
of women is substantially related to an important governmental
function."0 2 The court would not accept "outdated stereotypical
notions" or "administrative convenience" as a basis for gender
discrimination. "Equal protection involves protection from seem-
ingly well-intended classifications that in fact relegate women to
an inferior status."' 3 The Court concluded:
It is incongruous that Congress believes on the one hand
that it substantially enhances our national defense to con-
stantly expand the utilization of women in the military, and
on the other hand endorses legislation excluding women
from the pool of registrants available for induction. Congress
allocates funds so that the military can use and actively
seek more female recruits but nonetheless asserts that there
is justification for excluding females from selective ser-
vice .... 0o
and found the Military Selective Service Act of 1980 in violation
of the Fifth Amendment.0 5
Weinberg Interview (cited in note 17).
Id.
10 Goldberg v Rostker, 509 F Supp 586, 605 (E D Pa 1980).
101 Id at 593 quoting Feeney, 442 US at 273.
2 Id at 596.
103 Id at 594.
114 Id at 603.
105 Id at 605.
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Suddenly it appeared that no one would have to register, at
least for a while. Predictably, the Justice Department appealed to
the Supreme Court. Justice William Rehnquist wrote the opinion,
which stressed that since the "purpose of registration was to
prepare for a draft of combat troops ... [and] since women are
excluded from combat," it was reasonable for Congress to con-
clude "that they would not be needed in the event of a draft." He
denied that the draft was a differential burden on two similarly
situated groups. An all-male draft was not like an "all-black...
or an ... all-Lutheran" army. "The Constitution requires that
Congress treat similarly situated persons similarly, not that it
engage in gestures of superficial equality.""°6
Justice Byron White dissented on the grounds that Congress
had not "concluded that every position in the military, no matter
how far removed from combat, must be filled with combat-ready
men"; since women were useful to the military, he thought they
should be registered. But he did not think that excluding women
would "offend the Constitution."' 7 Only Thurgood Marshall was
disposed to treat the matter as one of equal civic obligation. In a
ringing dissent, Justice Marshall objected on principled grounds.
He thought that in accommodating Congress, the Court was itself
avoiding its own "constitutional obligation" to judge congressional
enactments by "the standards of the Constitution," which require
equal protection of the laws.' 8 "The Court today places its im-
primatur on one of the most potent remaining public expressions
of ancient canards about the proper role of women," he asserted.
Upholding differential registration "categorically excludes women
from a fundamental civic obligation."0 9
V
It took more than a century, from the Revolutionary era to
the first decades of the twentieth century, before it was firmly
established that women not only had a negative obligation to
refrain from treason but a positive obligation to offer allegiance
and loyalty."0 It took nearly a century to develop a precise un-
derstanding of the behaviors required of jury service and to ar-
rive at a general consensus that jury service is an obligation
10 Rostker v Goldberg, 453 US 57 (1981).
107 Id at 83 (White dissenting).
Id at 112-13 (Marshall dissenting).
" Rostker, 453 US at 86 (Marshall dissenting).
..0 See Kerber, 97 Am Hist Rev 349 (cited in note 1).
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which rests equally on citizens regardless of gender."' But of
bearing arms there is still nothing resembling a consensus. The
obligation to military service, with all its risks, is part of the
process by which, as Lauren Berlant phrased it, "nationality has
been created, secured and deployed." If power is "continuously
constructed in difference from and competition with other politi-
cal and social formations," then the military is a central site on
which we can examine its construction."' In the progressive
era, criticism of war was a major part of a feminist critique of the
public order, as the career of Jane Addams attests. It was part of
the feminist critique through the Vietnam era. But although
many feminists maintained a pacifist skepticism deep into the
1970s, increasing numbers found that skepticism difficult to
maintain in the presence of an all-volunteer army and the cam-
paign for the Equal Rights Amendment."' The first removed
the threat of a draft; the latter drew them into a rhetoric of equal
opportunity and equal obligation. By the late-1980s, virtually all
liberal women's advocacy organizations were linking military
participation to first-class citizenship."
There is no doubt that women form an increasing proportion
of military strength and that they have been placed in positions
which erode binary distinctions between "combat" and "non-com-
bat." With increasing frequency in recent years, scholars and
activists have suggested that by construing the Second Amend-
ment to mean the right of men to be part of militias, the National
Guard, and the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard, men
have been empowered to monopolize the agencies of state power
and state violence. It seems increasingly clear that among the
social implications of this monopoly is the valorization of male
violence outside formal military institutions."5 Male monopoli-
zation of state violence is effectively contested on the site of ur-
ban police forces, where women-and lesbians and gay
men-daily demonstrate their competence as agents of state
1 See Kerber, A Right to be Ladies (cited in note 2).
1.2 Lauren Berlant, The Anatomy of National Fantasy: Hawthorne, Utopia and Every-
day Life 9 (Chicago, 1991).
" Cynthia Enloe has remarked that peace activists find "the issue of women in the
military ... ideologically awkward." Enloe, The Morning After at 210 (cited in note 85).
114 Id at 210-11.
" See Becker, Women's Wrongs (cited in note 7). Elizabeth Schneider suggests that
Constitutional protections of privacy have also had the effect of making domestic violence
harder to monitor and control. Elizabeth Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 Corn L
Rev 973, 984 (1991).
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power.116 Even before the Gulf War, women were placed in posi-
tions on patrol ships and stationed on the fringes of the defense
perimeter; they were in "combat support" units in Panama and in
Saudi Arabia. In the Panama invasion of 1989, Army Captain
Linda Bray led a military police unit in an exchange of fire while
conducting what had been expected to be a police mission;". in
the Gulf War women were killed and at least one taken prison-
er."8 The "lesson" of Vietnam, that units must be kept together,
means that women members of companies will not be pulled out
when the entire company is placed in increasingly vulnerable
positions. At the end of the Gulf War, women pilots were de-
manding an end to the combat restrictions-although, notably,
enlisted women were not. Embarrassment about the Tailhook
scandal and what it revealed about the culture of heterosexuality
in the military, and the current debates on the status of gay men
and lesbians in the military has had the effect of deflecting argu-
ment about "straight" women's status in the military and eroding
the line between "combat" and "non-combat" assignments.
The erosion of the category of "non-combat" means that it is
harder to draw a distinction between military roles which both
men and women may play and military roles reserved to men.
That is why, I suspect, attention has turned to those who occupy
ambiguous gender space. It also means-and, for all I know, may
already have meant-that once a woman citizen has voluntarily
entered the army and sworn a particular oath of obligation, she
may not refuse an order from her commanding officer that she
enter a combat situation. I expect that sooner or later we will
find a court-martial testing this point. But the erosion of the
combat exemption does not necessarily or directly tell us about
Americans' understanding of whether all women, like all men,
have an obligation to bear arms, to put their lives at risk when
the Commander-in-Chief decides it is appropriate. The use of
women in the Gulf War may increase the likelihood, but does not
ensure, that women will also be drafted-that is, that all women
will be understood to have a military obligation.
The relationship of women to state violence challenges us to
know considerably more than we do now about the relationship
"' See Ralph Blumenthal, Gay Officers Find Acceptance on New York's Police Force,
NY Times Al (Feb 21, 1993).
"' See Susanne Schafer, Services Under Fire for Keeping Women out of Combat Jobs,
LA Times A2 (Apr 22, 1990).
"' See John Cushman, Top Admiral Backs Full Combat Roles for Women in Navy, NY
Times Al (Apr 5, 1993).
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between gender and aggression and to consider more precisely
the way this relationship has been, and ought to be, deployed by
the state."' We live at a time when traditional markings of sys-
tems of gender difference are changing. What we are learn-
ing-in the enrollment of women into other units of state force
and violence, notably police departments and corrections forces,
as well as the gradual absorption of women into military roles
accompanied by scandals like Tailhook and the vulnerability of
gay service people to violent physical attack-is that it is possible
to revise even this most traditional system of gender difference
while at the same time keeping systems of male domination
intact. Robert J. Cottrol and Raymond T. Diamond have observed
"[tlhroughout American history, black and white Americans have
had radically different experiences with respect to violence and
state protection.... [F]or many of those who shape or critique
constitutional policy, the state's power and inclination to protect
them is a given. But for all too many black Americans, that pro-
tection historically has not been available."20 What we are
learning now about the prevalence of domestic violence is making
it increasingly clear that men and women have also had radically
different experiences with respect to violence and state protec-
tion. Women, as a class, have not been able to count on the
availability of state protection."
If I were to make a prediction, it is that we have already slid
into a situation in which the protective exclusion of women from
the obligation to enact state-directed violence is eroded. I think
Judy Goldsmith was prescient in linking women's ability to use
physical force with resistance to sexual violence. As our estimates
of the vulnerability of women to domestic violence grows and the
case for increasing women's capacity for physical resistance in-
creases, the promise that women can rely on men for physical
protection looks increasingly like an empty one. The process will
be-as in the development of other civic obligations-a somewhat
extended one. It is likely to be accompanied by hostility against
feminists for their complicity in developing an ideology in which
.9 For thoughtful reflections on the associations of race, sex and violence, see George
L. Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern
Europe (Wisconsin, 1985), and Karst, 38 UCLA L Rev 499 (cited in note 36).
29 Robert J. Cottrol and Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an
Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 30' Georgetown L J 309, 359 (1991).
.21 See Elizabeth Schneider, 23 Conn L Rev at 985 (cited in note 115), and Susan
Schecter, Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles of the Battered Women's
Movement 3 (South End Press, 1982).
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it appeared that traditional immunity against military obligation
had been traded off for inchoate opportunities which many tradi-
tional women do not understand to be an advantage-an ideology
which also abandoned Antigone's ancient claim to stand as skep-
tic and to voice the claims of higher obligations rather than those
which the state would place upon them.
